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Courts have divided over whether a former employee of a corpo-
ration can be forced to produce documents in response to a subpoena
when the production of the documents would implicate the employee
in a crime. This question turns on whether a former corporate em-
ployee or officer maintains a representative relationship with the cor-
poration following his employment, or if his ability to represent the
corporation terminates with his employment.
While it is well-established that the government may not compel
an individual to give testimony that would be self-incriminating, the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination typically does
not apply to the contents of business documents that the government
requests through a subpoena.1 For example, the government may sub-
poena business records that a defendant created for his own benefit
that reveal incriminating information. In contrast, a prosecutor could
not call that defendant before a grand jury and force him to testify
against himself regarding those documents. This seemingly artificial
distinction under the Fifth Amendment is based on the interpretation
of the word "compel."2 Because the government did not compel the
defendant to create the business records, it does not "compel" the de-
fendant to "testify" against himself. However, when the government
forces the defendant to give oral testimony as to the information con-
tained in those records, such testimony is considered compelled and
thus protected by the Fifth Amendment.'
t S.B. 1999, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. Candidate 2002, The University of
Chicago.
1 The exact nature of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not per-
tinent to this analysis. For a more detailed discussion of the application of the privilege to the
contents of documents, see Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth
Amendment Seriously, 73 Va L Rev 1, 49-74 (1987) (listing exceptions to the general rule that
contents of corporate documents are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and specifically addressing the artificial entities exception and the required
records exception).
2 Fisher v United States, 425 US 391,397 (1976), quoting Perlman v United States, 247 US 7,
15 (1918) ("The Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting
the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege.").
3 United States v Doe, 465 US 605,610 (1984) ("As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amend-
ment protects the person asserting the privilege only from compelled self-incrimination. Where
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But in some cases the mere act of producing documents in re-
sponse to a subpoena reveals incriminating information, and in these
instances the subpoena may implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has developed an ana-
lytical framework for all documentary subpoenas that turns on the
testimonial and incriminating nature of the act of production.4 The act
of production may communicate to the grand jury or prosecutor the
individual's possession of the subpoenaed documents, as well as his
knowledge regarding their existence and authenticity.' Thus, the in-
criminating nature of the act of production is distinct from the con-
tents of the document itself. Instead, the validity of the documentary
subpoena turns on the potentially incriminating implications of the ac-
tual act of producing the documents.
However, according to the Supreme Court, a collective or artifi-
cial entity does not hold any privilege against self-incrimination.! This
doctrine, known as the collective entity doctrine, relies on the notion
that a corporation is an entity independent of those who comprise it.
The doctrine states that if an employee holds corporate records as a
representative of an entity independent of himself (for example, a
corporation), then he can be compelled to produce those documents
because he would be acting on behalf of the corporation rather than
himself. In order to preserve the individual's privilege against self-
incrimination, the prosecutor may not use the individual's act of pro-
duction against him individually, but instead must attribute the act of
production to the corporation as a whole.
The act of production doctrine generally applies in all cases in-
volving documentary subpoenas. However, where the target of the
subpoena is a collective entity or a representative of such an entity, the
collective entity doctrine operates as an exception to the general rule.
Thus, where the collective entity doctrine applies, a prosecutor can ob-
tain requested documents belonging to an entity, but cannot identify
the individual who produced the incriminating documents. Where the
collective entity doctrine does not apply, however, the act of produc-
tion doctrine precludes the production of documents altogether,
thereby denying a prosecutor potentially incriminating evidence.
the preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present.") (citation omitted).
4 See Fisher, 425 US at 410 ("The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena ...
has communicative aspects.").
5 Id ("Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers de-
manded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's be-
lief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.").
6 Braswell v United States, 487 US 99, 102 (1988) (noting that "it is well established that
such artificial entities [corporations] are not protected by the Fifth Amendment").
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A growing circuit split demonstrates that the role of these two
doctrines in the context of former corporate employees is unclear. The
Eleventh Circuit, relying on the nature of the documents sought, held
that under the collective entity doctrine the government can compel a
former employee to produce corporate documents that remain in his
personal possession following the termination of his employment In
contrast, the Second Circuit ruled that an employee no longer acts as a
representative of his former employer following termination, and thus
the government may be precluded from obtaining documents if the
8act of production might incriminate the former employee.
This Comment resolves the circuit split by looking to principles of
corporate law. More specifically, this Comment argues that the collec-
tive entity doctrine should apply to former employees in cases where
there is a continuing fiduciary relationship following the termination
of employment. For instance, following the dissolution of a corpora-
tion, the former business's directors have fiduciary obligations to the
corporation until the resolution of all remaining corporate affairs
Consequently, these directors maintain a representative relationship
with that corporation, and the collective entity doctrine should govern.
However, where there is no such continuing fiduciary or other such
obligation, the act of 'production doctrine should apply in order to
protect the individual's fundamental privilege against self-
incrimination. Thus, in the context of a continuing fiduciary obligation,
as with current employees and officers, the documents requested may
be produced, but the act of production may not be attributed to any
individual. If there is no continuing obligation on the part of the for-
mer employee or officer, then the documents may not be produced by
virtue of the potentially incriminating nature of the act of production.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the context of
documentary subpoenas. It also explains how the act of production
and collective entity doctrines operate to protect this privilege. Part II
describes the different approaches that courts have taken to deter-
7 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov 12, 1991, 957 F2d 807, 812-13 (11th Cir 1992)
(holding that a former corporate official whose employment was terminated after acquiring cus-
tody of corporate documents is required to produce those documents under the collective entity
doctrine).
8 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan 29, 1999,191 F3d 173,181-84
(2d Cir 1999) (holding that three former officers of a corporation could not be compelled to
produce corporate documents in their possession pursuant to the collective entity doctrine be-
cause their capacity to represent he corporation as agents had already been terminated).
9 William Meade Fletcher, 19 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 3:150 at 453 (Callaghan perm ed 1988) (noting that "statutes will usually provide that, upon the
dissolution, the directors of the corporation shall have charge of the work of liquidation and dis-
tribution").
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mine whether former corporate employees can be compelled to pro-
duce potentially self-incriminating corporate documents. Part III pro-
poses a new approach to the analysis by relying on principles of cor-
porate law to determine whether the former mployee and the corpo-
ration have a continuing representative relationship that would dic-
tate the application of the collective entity doctrine.
I. THE ACT OF PRODUCTION AND COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINES
The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be ... com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' The pur-
pose of the Fifth Amendment privilege is to prevent the use of legal
compulsion to force the accused to make sworn testimony that would
be used to incriminate him." An individual must show three distinct
elements to establish that his privilege against self-incrimination is be-
ing infringed: (1) that there is testimony; (2) that the testimony is
compelled; and (3) that the testimony is incriminating. The Court's
current jurisprudence holds that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not protect the contents of business
documents, but rather only the act of production itself." The Court's
distinction between the act of production and the contents promotes
the Fifth Amendment aim of protecting the accused from potentially
incriminating himself by averring the existence, the authenticity, and
his possession of the documents requested.
10 US Const Amend V.
11 Doe v United States, 487 US 201,212 (1988).
12 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 410 (1976) (emphasizing that whether an in-
fringement of the privilege against self-incrimination has occurred turns on whether there is
compulsion, whether the act of production is testimonial, and whether it is incriminating).
13 Prior to Fisher, the Court had referred to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as protecting the contents of personal documents. See Boyd v United States, 116
US 616, 630 (1886) (characterizing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as protecting personal se-
curity and privacy). But the Court changed the direction of this jurisprudence in Fisher. As Jus-
tice Brennan explained in his concurrence in Fisher: "History and principle teach that the privacy
protected by the Fifth Amendment extends not just to the individual's immediate declarations,
oral or written, but also to his testimonial materials in the form of books and papers." 425 US at
418. However, the Fisher majority focused on the fact that the subpoena served on the accused
did not compel oral testimony or require the accused to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the
documents sought, rather than focusing on the question of whether the documents contained
private information. See Fisher, 425 US at 400 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment protects
citizens against self-incrimination but not against the disclosure of private information gener-
ally). Justice O'Connor sought to make this distinction explicit in United States v Doe:
I write ... just to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of [the majority's] opinion:
that the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private pa-
pers of any kind. The notion that the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of papers origi-
nated in Boyd v. United States ... but our decision in Fisher v. United States ... sounded the
death knell for Boyd.
465 US 605,618 (1984) (citations omitted).
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A. The Act of Production Doctrine
The Court espoused the act of production doctrine in Fisher v
United States," which established that "the Fifth Amendment would
not be violated by the fact alone that the papers on their face might
incriminate [the petitioner], for the privilege protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial commu-
nications."'" The Court held in Fisher that an attorney was required to
produce his client's accountant's documents because the accountant's
documents had been created without any government compulsion. Al-
though the act of producing the documents had communicative as-
pects of its own, the Court reasoned that the act would not involve in-
criminating testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment,6
because the documents' existence was a "foregone conclusion."'7 Even
if the act of production would usually trigger the privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court explained, the government may still compel
the production of the documents if it can show that the act of produc-
tion itself would not add to the government's information about the
case." If the potentially incriminating aspects of the act of production
are a "foregone conclusion," then "[u]nder these circumstances by en-
forcement of the summons 'no constitutional rights are touched. The
question is not of testimony but of surrender."9 Thus, according to the
Fisher Court, an individual is permitted to assert his personal privilege
against self-incrimination only if the act of producing the documents
itself might be incriminating." An individual may not assert the Fifth
Amendment purely because the contents of the documents requested
might be incriminating.2'
14 425 US 391 (1976).
15 Id at 409.
16 In Fisher, the government had prior knowledge of the existence of the documents re-
quested, and production of the documents by the defendant would not be used for authentica-
tion purposes. Id at 413 (noting that the "taxpayer did not prepare the papers and could not
vouch for their accuracy"). See also id at 402 (holding that "compelled production of documents
from an attorney does not implicate" a taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege).
17 Idat411.
18 Id at 411-12 (noting that because the existence and location of the requested documents
were a foregone conclusion, the tacit admissions related to the act of production were not suffi-
cient to implicate the privilege against self-incrimination).
19 Id at 411, quoting In re Harris, 221 US 274, 279 (1911). More specifically, the foregone
conclusion doctrine states that the government must show: (1) the government is not relying on
the truth-telling aspect of the act of production; (2) the witness adds little or nothing to the gov-
ernment's already established knowledge about the existence and location of the papers by con-
ceding his possession of the papers; (3) existence and possession are not critical to the case. See
Mosteller, 73 Va L Rev at 30 (cited in note 1).
20 See Fisher, 425 US at 410.
21 See id. The act of production doctrine applies to all cases involving the compelled pro-
duction of documents, while the collective entity doctrine only applies in the corporate context.
Braswell v United States, 487 US 99, 109-10 (1988) (noting that although "the act of production
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This perhaps artificial distinction between the act of production
and contents of the document rests on the fact that the individual vol-
untarily created the document being sought. Consequently, under the
Fifth Amendment, the individual was not "compelled" to create what-
ever information is within the document." As the Supreme Court ex-
plained, "[T]he Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-
incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.'", There-
fore, the government may compel the production of papers that an in-
dividual prepares in a private capacity.4
The act of production doctrine addresses the policy concern that
the act of producing certain documents requested in a subpoena duces
tecum may cause the witness to incriminate himself in a number of
ways. The act of production may communicate that: "i) documents re-
sponsive to a given subpoena exist; ii) they are in the possession or
control of the subpoenaed party; iii) the documents provided in re-
sponse to the subpoena are authentic; and iv) the responding party be-
lieves that the documents produced are those described in the sub-
poena."'
The Court most recently rearticulated the principles underlying
the doctrine in United States v Hubbell.26 The Court held that the act of
production in response to a broad grand jury subpoena would be
self-incriminating not because of the contents of the documents, but
because responding to the subpoena would aver the witness's posses-
sion of such documents, as well as the witness's belief that these were
the documents sought. The Supreme Court reemphasized the Fisher
privilege is available without regard to the entity whose records are being sought," the agents of
a corporation responding to a subpoena duces tecum are ultimately acting in a representative
capacity and thus cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Thus,
the Court has recognized the attributed act theory-when an individual produces documents in
response to a subpoena as a representative of a corporation, the act of producing the documents
is not attributed to the individual, but rather to the corporation as a whole. Id at 117-18. As a re-
sult, an individual acting in a representative capacity for a corporation may never refuse to pro-
duce corporate documents that are under his custody-but the government may not use the fact
that he (as an individual) actually produced the documents. Id.
22 United States v Doe, 465 US 605,610 (1984). See note 3 and accompanying text.
23 Fisher, 425 US at 401, quoting United States v Nobles, 422 US 225,233 n 7 (1975).
24 Doe, 465 US at 618 (O'Connor concurring).
25 United States v Hubbell, 167 F3d 552, 567-68, 575-81 (DC Cir 1999), affd, 530 US 27
(2000) (remanding for a determination of whether the government had the requisite knowledge
so that compelled production of documents would not infringe the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment rights).
26 530 US 27 (2000).
27 The district court characterized the subpoena as "the quintessential fishing expedition."
Id at 32, quoting United States v Hubbell, 11 F Supp 2d 25,37 (D DC 1998).
28 See Hubbell, 530 US at 45 ("Given our conclusion that respondent's act of production
had a testimonial aspect ... respondent could not be compelled to produce those documents.").
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principle that the potentially self-incriminating nature of the act of
production is the critical issue in Fifth Amendment analysis.
2
The analysis that courts use to determine if the act of production
is self-incriminating is very fact-specific, and seemingly identical fac-
tors between cases must be carefully analyzed within the context of
each case.0 For instance, one factor that courts consider in deciding
whether the act of producing the documents constitutes "testimony"
or a mere "surrender" of knowledge is the extent of the government's
specific knowledge of the documents in question.' The lack of speci-
ficity of the government's knowledge or request may show that it is at-
tempting a "fishing expedition" and using the defendant as the pri-
mary informant against himself. 2 Alternatively, highly specific knowl-
edge or requests by the government may show that it is using the de-
fendant's act of production as a self-incriminating act of authentica-
tion by affirming possession and control of the documents.33
B. The Collective Entity Doctrine
Analyzing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination becomes even more complex when the government
subpoenas corporate documents because the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege does not extend to corporations and instead only applies to natu-
ral persons.3' Under the collective entity doctrine, the corporation is
considered to be an entity independent from the individuals it is com-
prised of and thus outside the scope of protection of the Fifth
Amendment. Traditionally the collective entity doctrine has been jus-
29 Id at 40 ("The 'compelled testimony' that is relevant in this case is not to be found in the
contents of the documents produced in response to the subpoena. It is, rather, the testimony in-
herent in the act of producing those documents.").
30 See Fisher, 425 US at 410 (stating that Fifth Amendment self-incrimination analysis may
"depend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases").
31 Id at 411 (considering the sum total of the government's knowledge without the defen-
dant's act of production), citing In re Harris, 221 US 274, 279 (1911). See also In the Matter of
Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F2d 327, 335 (3d Cir 1982) (noting that the broad
subpoenas issued by the government were an attempt to compensate for a lack of knowledge, ef-
fectively requiring the target of the subpoenas to become an informant against himself).
32 See, for example, Hubbell, 530 US at 43 (finding that the respondent was entitled to pro-
tection from grand jury's subpoena for broad categories of documents under the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, and noting that "we have no doubt that the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from
being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of
sources of potentially incriminating evidence").
33 See, for example, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 22, 1983 and
June 22, 1983 ("Saxon Industries"), 722 F2d 981, 983 (2d Cir 1983) (finding that requests for
documents the government already possessed could only be testimonial in nature).
34 Braswell v United States, 487 US 99, 105 (1988) (stating that, unlike an individual, "a
corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege").
35 See id at 102 (noting that "it is well established that such artificial entities are not pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment").
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tified by the state's power to regulate the entity to ensure that a cor-
poration acts for the public good and within the limits of its state-
36
granted charter. Thus, although an individual representing the corpo-
ration would be forced to respond to the subpoena duces tecum, the
documents requested are the property of the corporation, and thus of
a public nature, precluding the individual from invoking his personal
privilege against self-incrimination.37
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has evolved from focusing on
a property rights rationale to focusing on an agency rationale for the
collective entity doctrine." An individual who is a representative of a
group is not acting in his personal capacity when compelled by a sub-
poena to produce business records of that group even if the records
might be personally incriminating. Under this line of reasoning, the
Court has not limited the definition of a collective entity to a corpora-
tion, and has even applied it to a small partnership."
Moreover, the Court has reasoned that enforcement of govern-
mental regulations of corporate entities would be wholly ineffective
without compelled production because the only way for a corporation
to produce documents is through its representatives.40 If corporate
representatives were allowed to assert their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, proponents of the doctrine claim the
government would be unable to gain possession of the information it
needs for a successful investigation and prosecution."
Thus, employees or officers of a corporation act as agents of that
corporation, a collective entity. As representatives of the corporation,
these individuals may not refuse to produce documents because the
36 See Wilson v United States, 221 US 361, 383 (1911) ("[T]he corporation is a creature of
the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain spe-
cial privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations
of its charter. Its powers are limited by law."). However, because such a rationale only covered
corporations, when the Court later extended the doctrine to other organizations such as labor
unions and partnerships, it justified the expansion by a "more general governmental need to
regulate the affairs of economically powerful organizations." David N. Lathrop, Comment, The
Collective Entity Doctrine and the Compelled Testimony Standard, 16 Hastings Const L Q 553,
557 (1989).
37 Wilson, 221 US at 378-80 (distinguishing between the privileges accorded private and
public documents).
38 See Braswell, 487 US at 109 (noting that the "agency rationale undergirding the collec-
tive entity [doctrine] ... survives").
39 See, for example, Bellis v United States, 417 US 85,95,97 (1974) ("While small, the part-
nership here did have an established institutional identity independent of its individual partners
•.. [and] petitioner is holding the subpoenaed partnership records in a representative capacity.").
40 Id at 91 (stating that "[w]ere the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these imper-
sonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be
impossible"), quoting United States v White, 322 US 694,700 (1944).
41 See Bellis, 417 US at 90 (noting that "recognition of the individual's claim of privilege
with respect to ... financial records ... would ... largely frustrate legitimate governmental regu-
lation").
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documents might be self-incriminating.2 Compelling production of
documents by an individual in his capacity as representative of a cor-
poration "does not invade his personal privacy or dignity" otherwise
protected by the Fifth Amendment.3
C. The Roles of the Act of Production and Collective
Entity Doctrines
After Fisher, it was unclear whether the Court's holding signaled
the abandonment of the collective entity doctrine, or if it was meant to
fill another niche in this amorphous area of the law. Initially, the reli-
ance of the Court on the act of production doctrine in Fisher led to a
circuit split on which doctrine controlled the use of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination by custodians of business re-
cords. Through its holdings in Braswell v United States" and United
States v Doe,"5 the Court tried to clarify the distinctions between the
two doctrines by focusing on the form of business.
In Doe, the Court held that the petitioner, as the owner of several
sole proprietorships, could not be compelled to produce business
documents." Relying on a district court's finding that the act of pro-
ducing the documents would reveal incriminating information, the
court concluded that the act of production doctrine shielded the de-
fendant from turning over the records. In contrast, the petitioner in
Braswell initially operated his business as a sole proprietorship, but
eventually incorporated it. 7
The district court "rejected petitioner's argument that the collec-
tive entity doctrine does not apply when a corporation is so small that
42 See id at 88 (stating that "an individual cannot rely upon the privilege to avoid produc-
ing the records of a collective entity which are in his possession in a representative capacity, even
if these records might incriminate him personally").
43 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 22, 1983 and June 22, 1983
("Saxon Industries"), 722 F2d 981, 984,986-87 (emphasis added) (remanding, however, for a de-
termination of whether the compelled act of producing corporate documents was self-
incrimination by a former employee and therefore unlawful). Note that a custodian of corporate
records cannot be compelled to give oral testimony regarding those letters. As the Supreme
Court has explained:
A custodian, by assuming the duties of his office, undertakes the obligation to produce the
books of which he is custodian in response to a rightful exercise of the State's visitorial
powers. But he cannot lawfully be compelled, in the absence of a grant of adequate immu-
nity from prosecution, to condemn himself by his own oral testimony.
Curcio v United States, 354 US 118, 123-24 (1957). However, a representative may assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a personal capacity in order to shield
himself from potential individual incrimination resulting from the act of production itself. See
note 21 (discussing the attributed act theory).
44 487 US 99 (1988).
45 465 US 605 (1984).
46, Id at 606,612-14.
47 Braswell, 487 US at 100-01.
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it constitutes nothing more than the individual's alter ego." In affirm-
ing the lower court, the majority in Braswell clearly distinguished the
compelled testimony or act of production doctrine from the tradi-
tional collective entity doctrine by differentiating between custodians
of business records for corporations and for other types of businesses,
such as sole proprietorships." Braswell held that a representative of a
corporation, although it was run essentially as a sole proprietorship,
cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination." The majority also made clear that Fisher had not re-
placed the collective entity doctrine with the act of production doc-
trine, and that the collective entity doctrine was still valid and contin-
ued to be based on an agency rationale."
It therefore seems that the distinguishing feature between Doe
and Braswell is that the petitioner's business in Braswell was con-
ducted through the corporate form, while the petitioner's business in
Doe was conducted in a more informal fashion. The Court stated in
Braswell that "[h]ad petitioner conducted his business as a sole pro-
prietorship, Doe would require that he be provided the opportunity to
show that his act of production would entail testimonial self-
incrimination."52 Corporate law differentiates between sole proprietor-
ships and corporations on the basis that a sole proprietorship "in-
volves neither the creation of a new separate entity nor the shifting of
assets from one individual to another individual or entity."53 Thus, the
Court pays due deference to the well-established principle of corpo-
rate law distinguishing between a corporation and a sole proprietor-
ship. The collective entity doctrine applies in cases involving corpora-
tions and the act of production doctrine applies in cases involving sole
proprietorships.
48 Id at 102. The decision in Braswell to apply the collective entity doctrine to such a small
entity seems to be a logical extension of the Court's holding in Bellis v United States that a three-
person partnership was still subject to the collective entity doctrine. Bellis, 417 US 85, 86, 101
(1974). Dicta in Bellis allude to the possible existence of a "Mom-and-Pop" exception, exempting
a "small family partnership" or a partnership involving a "pre-existing relationship of confidenti-
ality among the partners." Id at 101. However, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted
that this exception would not apply to the partnership at issue because the defendant held the
partnership's records, which were the partnership's property under state law, in a representative
capacity. Id at 97-98, 101.
49 Braswell, 487 US at 104 (explaining the collective entity rule).
50 Id.
51 Id at 109 ("To be sure, the holding in Fisher ... embarked upon a new course of Fifth
Amendment analysis.... [But the] agency rationale undergirding the collective entity [doctrine]
... survives.").
52 Id at 104.
53 Roger M. Ritt and Michael J. Nathanson, Choice of Business Entity, SC65 ALI-ABA 19,
21 (1998).
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II. THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY AND ACr OF PRODUCTION
DOCTRINES IN THE CONTEXT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES
The scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination regarding former corporate employees and the produc-
tion of corporate documents is ambiguous. The Court's decisions in
Fisher and Braswell do not definitively establish the analysis for de-
termining under what circumstances the privilege exists. Instead, it is
unclear whether the content and the corporate nature of business
documents continues to be relevant to determine whether a former
employee is able to invoke his personal privilege against self-
incrimination to avoid production of such documents. The Supreme
Court last explicitly spoke on the issue of former officers and partners
in the earlier part of the century, long before it shifted to the com-
pelled testimony analysis of Fisher and Braswell.' Thus, it is unclear
whether the property rights and privacy rationales underlying those
cases continue to survive today.
A. The Context of Previously Dissolved Corporations
In the earlier part of the previous century, the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of the application of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination in the context of former officers of dis-
solved corporations.'5 The Court, relying on a property rights rationale,
held that the dissolution of a corporation did not change the essential
character of the corporation's books and papers. Thus, former officers
were precluded from invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to resist the production of documents that "were
still in existence and were still impressed with the incidents attending
corporate documents.' '% The dissolution of the corporation and pos-
session by the former officers did not make the documents "any more
privileged in the investigation of crime than they were before."7
Over time, the Court's justification for the post-dissolution appli-
cation of the corporate entity doctrine shifted from the property rights
rationale to an agency rationale. In Bellis v United States," the Court
relied on an agency rationale to echo the earlier principle that the col-
54 See Grant v United States, 227 US 74, 79-80 (1913) (holding that the former sole share-
holder of a defunct corporation must produce corporate records because the records were cor-
porate rather than personal); Wheeler v United States, 226 US 478, 489-90 (1913) (holding that
the former officers of a dissolved corporation could constitutionally be compelled to produce
corporate books and papers because the character of the records was corporate rather than per-
sonal).
55 See note 54.
56 Wheeler v United States, 226 US 478, 490 (1913).
57 Id.
58 417 US 85 (1974).
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lective entity doctrine continues to apply following dissolution.9 The
Court made clear that each partner retained his representative status
following the dissolution of the partnership, although the opinion pri-
marily focused on the fact that the entity was a partnership, and not
on the fact that the defendant was a former partner.-
The Court's general shift in focus from the property rights ration-
ale to the agency rationale for the collective entity doctrine supports
the preservation of the Court's application of the collective entity doc-
trine to former partners and officers of dissolved corporations. Corpo-
rate law dictates that directors, officers, and controlling shareholders
owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation and minority sharehold-
ers." Under many state statutes, the fiduciary obligation continues
whether the corporation is still in existence or has been dissolved," in
order to preserve claims by creditors and wind up the corporation's
63final affairs. These statutes extend the life of the corporation for spe-
cific intervals following the date of dissolution." During these inter-
vals, directors and officers owe fiduciary obligations to the corpora-
tion, and may even be held personally liable for distributing corporate
assets to shareholders before satisfying creditors' claims.6 However,
59 Id at 97-99.
60 Id at 96 n 3 ("[T]his Court's decisions have made clear that the dissolution of a corpora-
tion does not give the custodian of the corporate records any greater claim to the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.").
61 Franklin A. Gervurtz, Corporation Law 273 (West 2000) (stating that "directors and of-
ficers have a fiduciary duty to the corporation"). See also William Meade Fletcher, 3 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 837.50 at 181-83 (Clark Boardman Callaghan
perm ed 1994) (describing the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors and officers to the
shareholders of a corporation).
62 See J. Ronald Trost and Roger G. Schwartz, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Insolvent
Corporations, SD24 ALI-ABA 87, 91 (1998). For examples of such state statutes, see Ga Code
Ann § 14-2-1408(b) (Michie 2000); NM Stat Ann § 53-16-12(B) (Michie 2001); Alaska Stat
§ 10.06.660; Cal Corp Code § 2001 (West 1990).
63 Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency
and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 Del J Corp L 1, 66-67 (1995) (de-
scribing states' enactment of "survival" period provisions that "extended the corporate life for a
specific period post-dissolution for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits").
64 Id. Note that the specific obligations of officers, directors, and controlling shareholders
are also a matter of state statute. Because corporation laws vary from state to state, the exact na-
ture of the fiduciary obligations of former employees, officers, and directors will also vary ac-
cording to each state's corporations laws. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 607.1405(2)(c) (West
2000); NY Bus Corp Law § 1006(a)(1) (McKinney 2001); Tex Bus Corp Act Ann art 7.12(B)
(West 2000); Wash Rev Code § 23B.14.050(2)(c) (West 2001); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 10-1405(B)(3)
(West 2000); Neb Rev Stat § 21-20,155(2)(c) (Michie 2001); Ga Code Ann § 14-2-1408(b); NM
Stat Ann § 53-16-12(B); Alaska Stat § 10.06.660; Cal Corp Code § 2001. Note also that if the
statutory rule in the state of incorporation is to assign an independent receiver to resolve the in-
complete affairs of the corporation subsequent o dissolution, then the officer or director has a
sound basis for arguing that he is no longer a representative of the corporation.
65 Stilson, 20 Del J Corp L at 66-67 (cited in note 63). Note that following dissolution and
insolvency, the duty of corporate directors and officers shifts from shareholders to creditors. See
Trost and Schwartz, SD24 ALI-ABA at 95 (cited in note 62). However, such a shift in focus is
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some state corporation laws limit directors' and officers' liabilities
past this cut-off date.6
B. Compelling Former Officers and Employees to Produce
Self-Incriminating Documents
The Court's shift in focus from the contents of the requested
documents to the act of production in recent years has led to confu-
sion among the lower courts as to whether the contents-based privi-
lege survives Fisher at all, or whether instead the foundation for all
documentary subpoenas relies on the act of production. More spe-
cifically, the circuit courts disagree about the appropriate approach to
the question of whether the privilege against self-incrimination may
be invoked by a former officer or employee. The Second Circuit con-
cluded that the representative status of any employee is terminated
simultaneously with employment,6 whereas the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that it is the character of the records sought that determines whether
the collective entity doctrine continues to apply.6
1. Cases against compelling former employees to produce
potentially self-incriminating corporate records.
The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that once an employee or
officer is no longer employed at the company in question, he can no
longer serve as a representative of the company." In In re Grand Jury
tangential to the main principle of corporate law of a continuing fiduciary duty postdissolution,
and thus need not be considered here.
66 Stilson, 20 Del J Corp L at 66-69 (cited in note 63) (explaining that some state statutes
"ostensibly curtail directorial and shareholder liability after the statutory cut-off date").
67 See, for example, Anne Marie DeMarco and Elisa Scott, Note, Confusion among the
Courts: Should the Contents of Personal Papers Be Privileged by the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause?, 9 St John's J Legal Commen 219, 222 (1993) (noting that "[a] need has
therefore arisen for the Supreme Court to clearly state whether a contents-based privilege exists
today").
68 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 22, 1983 and June 22, 1983
("Saxon Industries"), 722 F2d 981,986-87 (2d Cir 1983). The Third and Ninth Circuits have de-
veloped a jurisprudence parallel to the Second Circuit's in this area. However, neither court has
analyzed the issue in as profound a manner. For instance, in United States v McLaughlin, 126 F3d
130, 134 (3d Cir 1997), the court held that compelling former corporate custodians to produce
documents would violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Ninth
Circuit explicitly stated that "the court follows the Second Circuit's decision in [Saxon Indus-
tries], ... and holds that the collective entity rule does not apply to a former employee of a col-
lective entity who is no longer acting on behalf of the collective entity." In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 71 F3d 723,724 (9th Cir 1995).
69 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov 12, 1991,957 F2d 807, 812 (11th Cir 1992). The
D.C. Circuit has adopted the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in the context of former govern-
ment officials. See In re Sealed Case (Government Records), 950 F2d 736, 739-41 (DC Cir 1991)
(holding that government records, as well as corporate records, cannot be the subject of a former
federal official's assertion of this Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
70 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 22, 1983 and June 22, 1983
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Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983
("Saxon Industries")," the court stated: "Under Fisher the standard is
not the potential incriminating nature and contents of the documents
subpoenaed but whether their mere production would itself tend to
incriminate the possessor.' The court explained the case of a present
employee:
[T]here would rarely be any dispute over the possession when
the person subpoenaed is required to respond in his representa-
tive capacity. In producing records as an officer of the company
he would not be attesting to his personal possession of them but
to their existence and possession by the corporation.""
In contrast, in the context of a former employee of a corporation,
the Second Circuit reasoned, the act of production may serve as a con-
firmation of the defendant's personal possession of the documents re-
quested. His terminated status as an employee, and representative, of
the corporation might imply that his possession of the documents was
wrongful, and the act of production might be self-incriminating to the
defendant as an individual."
In Saxon Industries, the subpoenaed witness was the target of the
grand jury investigation.75 The Second Circuit remanded for a deter-
mination of whether the compelled production (rather than the con-
tents of the documents) would be self-incriminating. The court rea-
soned that production might prove possession and "enable the gov-
ernment to argue in any criminal proceeding against him that his re-
moval of the documents from the company's files amounted to a tacit
admission that he had ... absconded with them because he believed
they were 'smoking gun' evidence of his guilt." 6
("Saxon Industries"), 722 F2d 981,986-88 (2d Cir 1983) ("Once the officer leaves the company's
employ ... he no longer acts as a corporate representative but functions in an individual capacity
in his possession of corporate records." The court remanded the case to determine whether the
act of production was self-incriminating.); In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated
Jan 29,1999 ("Grand Jury 1"), 191 F3d 173, 181,183-84 (2d Cir 1999) (reaffirming Saxon Indus-
tries after Braswell so that former employees are no longer corporate representatives and may
assert he Fifth Amendment privilege against the act of production).
71 722 F2d 981 (2d Cir 1983).
72 Id at 986. However, this case predates Braswell.
73 Id.
74 Id at 986-89 (remanding to the district court for a determination of whether the act of
production was self-incriminating).
75 See id at 982. Another distinguishing characteristic of Saxon Industries is that (according
to the former employee) most, if not all, of the documents requested by the government were
duplicates of documents that the government already possessed. Id at 983. Thus, although the de-
fendant in Saxon Industries may have misappropriated corporate records into his own posses-
sion, his possession of the documents was not sufficient to infringe upon his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See id at 986-88.
76 Id at 987.
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In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan 29, 1999
("Grand Jury I")," the Second Circuit reaffirmed its Saxon Industries
holding ' and held that its decision in Saxon Industries survived
Braswell.9 The majority held:
In the absence of legal authority to the effect that a former em-
ployee remains an agent of the corporation, or any evidence that
the corporation and the individual intended to maintain an
agency relationship, the foundation upon which Braswell rests-
that one who is currently employed by the corporation holds
documents as an agent in a custodial capacity so that it is actually
the corporation that is producing the records-is removed.8°
Moreover, the court disputed the contention that characterizing
former employees of a corporation as no longer representatives of
that corporation would create incentives for employees to leave with
documents to avoid producing them.1 The court found that there have
been "few reported incidents" of employees taking advantage of this
rule."' Additionally, the court reasoned that sanctions for theft and ob-
struction of justice,' and the government's ability to recover the
documents through other means, such as a search warrant," would
eliminate the perverse incentives for employees.
2. Cases requiring former employees to produce potentially self-
incriminating corporate records
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held in In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov 12 ("Grand Jury 11")8 that the
collective entity doctrine requires former employees to produce
documents relating to their former employers.6 The Eleventh Circuit
77 191 F3d 173 (2d Cir 1999).
78 Id at 181 (describing Saxon Industries as "good law").
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id at 182 (rejecting the government's argument that the decision would "create[] a per-
verse incentive for an employee to leave the corporation with the documents in his custody
rather than comply with his legal obligation to produce the documents").
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id at 183 (noting that "there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that prevents the gov-
ernment from proceeding to recover the documents itsel without compelling their production
by the person in possession, by means of a search warrant").
85 957 F2d 807 (11th Cir 1992).
86 Id at 812-13 (holding that a former corporate official whose employment was termi-
nated after he acquired copies of corporate documents was required to produce those docu-
ments under the collective entity doctrine).
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focused on the nature of the documents to establish the representative
relationship of the former employee to the corporation.n
In Grand Jury II, the court required a former corporate official,
who was terminated following a change in control, to produce docu-
ments held in a personal capacity under the collective entity doctrine.
Relying on early Supreme Court precedentm the court focused pri-
marily on the nature and contents of the documents requested rather
than on the representative status of the former employee."' The court
held: "It is the immutable character of the records as corporate which
requires their production and which dictates that they are held in a
representative capacity. Thus, the production of such documents is re-
quired regardless of whether the custodian is still associated with the
corporation or other collective entity."9
Thus, some courts focus on the potentially incriminating nature of
the act of production by former employees and some courts focus on
the creation of the documents by the collective entity. It is unclear
which doctrine controls whether a former employee is able to invoke
his personal privilege against self-incrimination to avoid production of
such documents.
III. A NEW APPROACH
This Comment proposes a new approach to the application of the
collective entity doctrine to the production of corporate documents in
the context of former corporate employees." This approach focuses on
the representative status of the former employee and looks to princi-
ples of corporate law to determine whether a representative relation-
ship continues to exist following the termination of employment.
More specifically, this approach considers the distinguishing character-
istics of employees in the contexts of a previously dissolved corpora-
tion, former employees of a corporation with a continuing existence,
and former employees of an acquired or merged corporation.
In recent years, the Court has shifted away from the previous
property rights and privacy rationales for determining the validity of
subpoenas duces tecum.n The underlying agency rationale for the col-
87 Id at 812 ("It is the immutable character of the records as corporate which requires their
production and which dictates that they are held in a representative capacity.").
88 See note 54.
89 Grand Jury 11, 957 F2d at 811 (noting that "the Second Circuit [in Saxon Industries] did
not consider the Supreme Court's prior decisions to the contrary in Wheeler and Grant").
90 Id at 812.
91 "[T]he term 'employee' in both Model Business Corporation Acts, includes officers but
not directors, although a director may accept duties which make that director also an employee."
William Meade Fletcher, 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 266 at 12
(West perm ed 1998). See also MBCA § 1.40(8) (ABA 1984).
92 Neville S. Hedley, Comment, Who Will Produce Corporate Documents? Case Comment
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lective entity doctrine focuses on the nature of the relationship be-
tween the former employee and the corporation. The Court has held
that if the individual is a member of an independent corporate entity,
then he is unable to assert his personal privilege against self-
incrimination because of his representative relationship with the cor-
poration.' Fisher and Doe make clear that the Court has moved to an
analytical framework that focuses on the potentially incriminating na-
ture of the act of production, rather than on the contents of the docu-
ments themselves."
This approach is echoed by the Second Circuit's reasoning in
finding that the representative status of an employee or officer is ter-
minated following the conclusion of his employment," using the
clearly demarcated relationships created by corporate law to deter-
mine when a representative relationship exists. This Comment sug-
gests that courts determine whether a representative relationship still
exists by looking to principles of corporate law that create and control
such employment and agency relationships. Specifically, in the context
of former employees, this Comment proposes looking to whether the
former employee continues to have a fiduciary obligation to the cor-
poration in order to determine representative status.
The Court's precedents from the earlier part of the twentieth cen-
tury are consistent with corporate law principles. Although the Court's
reasoning focused on the property rights and privacy rationales that
were prevalent at the time," the Court's shift of focus to the compelled
testimony standard in Fisher shows that such justifications are no
longer prevalent in this area of the law. Nevertheless, their holdings
should be preserved since they are consistent with the more modern
agency rationale of the collective entity doctrine.
The fiduciary obligations of corporate employees are determined
by the law of the state of incorporation."7 Typical corporate employees
of In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 30 New Eng L Rev 141, 151-54 (1995) (noting that
the Court's holding in Bellis "clearly signaled the shift from a property rights rationale, to a pri-
vacy rationale for determining if the privilege could be invoked" and that the Court's decision in
Fisher moved from focusing on. the privacy rationale to the compelled testimony standard).
93 Braswell, 487 US at 109-10 (explaining that because the custodian of corporate records
holds them in a representative capacity, his act of producing them is attributed to the corporation
and is therefore unprotected by the Fifth Amendment).
94 Id at 109 ("In Fisher and Doe, the Court moved away from the privacy-based collective
entity rule, replacing it with a compelled-testimony standard under which the contents of busi-
ness documents are never privileged but the act of producing the documents may be.").
95 See Part II.B.1.
96 See note 54.
97 Fletcher, 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia § 840 at 213 (cited in note 61) ("The determination offi-
cer's fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders is generally governed by the law of
the state of incorporation.").
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do not owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation,8 but they are still
considered agents of the corporation.9 Corporate directors and offi-
cers do owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation."O While at com-
mon law the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers and directors
terminate along with employment if the corporation continues to ex-
ist,'°1 most state statutes extend the fiduciary obligations of directors
postdissolution in order to wind up the corporation's remaining af-
fairs.°2
In the context of the collective entity doctrine, representative
status should be defined by the clearly demarcated fiduciary obliga-
tions determined by state corporate law. Therefore, the collective en-
tity doctrine should cease to apply following an employee or director's
termination, and instead the act of production doctrine alone should
control to protect former employees' and directors' Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. This reasoning should hold for
corporations that continue in existence either in their original forms
or for corporations that undergo a change in control, because of the
termination of the representative status of directors and employees in
both instances.
This mode of analysis is contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's ap-
proach. However, this analysis stays truer to the rationale underlying
the collective entity doctrine-that is, a representative of a collective
entity cannot assert a personal privilege against self-incrimination.3
98 Id § 846 at 226 (stating that "the concept of fiduciary duty is generally not applicable to
typical employees"). See, for example, Southeast Consultants, Inc v McCrary Engineering Corp,
246 Ga 503,273 SE2d 112. 115-16 (1980) (holding that a state statute imposing liability on direc-
tors and officers for appropriating business opportunities in violation of their duties did not ap-
ply to typical employees). Consider Cameco, Inc v Gedicke, 157 NJ 504, 724 A2d 783, 789, 791
(1999) (noting that officers, directors, and key executives owe a higher duty of loyalty to their
employers than lower level employees such as production line workers).
99 See Fletcher, 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia § 266 at 10-11 (cited in note 91) ("There is a marked
distinction between the officers who manage the affairs of a corporation, and its mere agents....
An agent is not an employee.").
100 Fletcher, 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia § 837.50 at 181 (cited in note 61) ("Directors stand in a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders.").
101 Id § 860 at 275 ("When a corporate officer ceases to act as such, either because of his or
her resignation or removal from office, or because of the insolvency of the corporation, the fidu-
ciary relationship ceases."). See, for example, Standage v Planned Investment Corp, 160 Ariz 287,
772 P2d 1140, 1144 (Ariz App 1986) (recognizing the general rule that a corporate officer's fidu-
ciary duty ceases at his resignation or removal, but finding an exception to this rule applicable in
this particular case); Microbiological Research Corp v Muna, 625 P2d 690, 695 (Utah 1981)
("When a corporate officer ceases to act as such, because of his resignation or removal, the fidu-
ciary relationship ceases.").
102 Fletcher, 19 Fletcher Cyclopedia § 3:150 at 453 (cited in note 9) (noting that "statutes will
usually provide that, upon the dissolution, the directors of the corporation shall have charge of
the work of liquidation and distribution").
103 Braswell, 487 US at 109-10 (explaining that a custodian of corporate documents holds
them "in a representative rather than a personal capacity," so the act of production is attributed
to the corporation and therefore unprotected by the Fifth Amendment).
Collective Entity and Act of Production Doctrines
Courts should not attempt to apply the collective entity doctrine until
they have concluded that the individual in fact is a representative of the
collective entity. Therefore, courts should rely on the principles of cor-
porate law to determine when an individual retains his status as a rep-
resentative of a corporation, and when that status, in fact, has been
terminated.
A. Previously Dissolved Corporations
In the context of previously dissolved corporations, the Court's
prior holdings are consistent with the relevant principles of corporate
law, and based on these holdings, courts should find that the collec-
tive entity doctrine continues to apply to former partners and officers
of a corporation. However, the Court has not dealt specifically with
the issue of former employees who are terminated as a result of disso-
lution. Because of key distinctions between employees and officers,
the collective entity doctrine should not apply to employees termi-
nated through dissolution of the corporation.
There are key distinctions between typical employees of a corpo-
ration and directors and officers of a corporation.'°6 The primary dis-
tinction is that employees do not owe a fiduciary obligation to the
corporation during or following their employment,° and have no con-
tinuing duties to a corporation following their termination,'°j unlike di-
rectors and officers." Moreover, following termination of employ-
ment, the corporation has no continuing vicarious liability."
Consequently, the representative relationship between typical
employees and the corporation should terminate simultaneously with
their employment, and consistent with the agency rationale, the collec-
tive entity doctrine should cease to apply once the representative rela-
tionship has ended. The collective entity doctrine may continue to ap-
ply to officers and directors of a previously dissolved corporation, but
not to previous employees of the corporation.
104 See text accompanying notes 97-102.
105 Fletcher, 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia § 266 at 265 (cited in note 91) ("There is a marked dis-
tinction between the officers who manage the affairs of a corporation and its mere [] [employ-
ees].").
106 See note 98 and accompanying text.
107 William A. Klein and John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and
Economic Principles 16 (Foundation 2000) (noting that the duties and obligations of an em-
ployee only exist for the duration of the employment contract).
108 See id.
109 See id at 18.
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B. Resignation or Removal
The act of production doctrine should apply to former employees
whose employment was terminated as a result of resignation or re-
moval because it is clear that they no longer act as representatives of
their former employer. Principles of corporate law dictate that em-
ployees of a corporation with a continuing existence who resign or are
removed no longer have any fiduciary obligation to their former em-
ployer," ' and no longer hold the powers associated with their former
position."' Thus, such employees do not serve as representatives of
their former employer past the termination of their employment."2
The Eleventh Circuit relied on the content and nature of the
documents requested in finding that a former corporate officer who
was removed from his position was still obligated to produce corpo-
rate records on demand."'3 However, the court relied on precedents
that predate the Supreme Court's shift to the compelled testimony
standard in Fisher.' The focus of these earlier precedents on the con-
tents of the documents was based on the property rights and privacy
rationales.. that were later superseded by the Court's compelled tes-
timony standard in Fisher. The Court's primary inquiry in Fisher fo-
cused on whether the individual's right against self-incrimination was
being infringed by compelling the act of production."6 Thus, while the
Eleventh Circuit's criticism of the Second Circuit's failure to look to
these precedents is valid, it also fails to recognize the significantly dif-
ferent approach that the Court took in Fisher." ' Instead, the court
looks to the previously eschewed property rights and privacy ration-
ales to hold that the content and nature of the documents controls
whether the collective entity doctrine applies to former employees." '
110 See note 101 and accompanying text.
111 See, for example, Maine Products Co vAlexander, 115 AD 109, 111,100 NYS 709 (1906)
("If the resolution dismissing the defendant was authorized, no act of the manager will bind the
company. Indeed, it is probable that the act of the company in dismissing the defendant ...
would, whether justified or not, terminate his power to bind the company.").
112 See Fletcher, 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia § 994 at 704-05 (cited in note 61) (stating that "per-
sons are liable as corporate officers, either under statute creating the liability or independent of
statute, and without regard to who is seeking to enforce the alleged liability, only where they
were officers at or during the time of the act or omission relied on as creating liability").
113 Grand Jury H, 957 F2d at 812-13. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
114 Id at 810-11, citing Wheeler v United States, 226 US 478, 490-91; Grant v United States,
227 US 74,79-80 (1913); and Bellis v United States, 417 US 85,88,96 n 3.
115 See text accompanying notes 36-38.
116 Fisher, 425 US at 409 (addressing the question "what, if any, incriminating testimony
within the Fifth Amendment's protection, is compelled by a documentary summons").
117 Grand Jury H, 957 F2d at 811 (failing to include Fisher meaningfully in the analysis).
118 Id at 812 ("It is the immutable character of the records as corporate which requires their
production.").
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After Fisher, it seems clear that the act of production doctrine
renders the contents of business documents irrelevant to determining
the validity of subpoenas duces tecum.9 Moreover, since the collective
entity doctrine primarily turns on the agency rationale, it seems that
the existence of a representative relationship should be the basis for
determining whether the collective entity doctrine continues to apply
past termination of employment. After Fisher, the threshold question
in determining whether the collective entity doctrine applies as an ex-
ception to the broader act of production doctrine is whether the de-
fendant is, in fact, a representative of the collective entity. Thus the
analysis focuses not on the creation or contents of the documents, but
the subsequent chronological step-the act of production." Such an
analysis focuses on the "communicative or noncommunicative nature
of the arguably incriminating disclosures sought to be compelled."2 '
Therefore, relying solely on the content and nature of the documents
sought ignores the basic rationale for the exception.)
The application of the act of production doctrine to determine
the validity of subpoenas duces tecum targeted at former employees
who have either resigned or been removed would not relieve those
former employees from liability for the wrongful acts they may have
committed during the course of their employment. Rather, this ap-
proach recognizes that a subpoena directed at a former employee is
more likely to target the employee as an individual than as a represen-
tative of the corporation.n The application of the act of production
doctrine rather than the collective entity doctrine would protect the
former employee from the incriminating act of production- affirming
his personal possession of the documents requested, which together
with his terminated status as employee and representative of the cor-
poration, implies that his possession of the documents 
was wrongful. 2
119 Braswell, 487 US at 109 ("In Fisher and Doe, the Court moved away from the privacy-
based collective entity rule, replacing it with a compelled-testimony standard under which the
contents of business documents are never privileged but the act of producing the documents may
be.").
120 See Lewis R. Katz and Paul C. Giannelli, 2 Katz Giannelli Criminal Law § 41.5 at 101-04
(West 1996) (describing the Court's rejection of the privacy rationale and adoption of the act of
production rationale).
121 In re Grand Jury Matter, 768 F2d 525, 528 (3d Cir 1985) (en banc) ("[Fisher and Doe]
make the significant factor, for the privilege against self-incrimination, neither the nature of the
entity which owns documents, nor the contents of the documents, but rather the communicative
or noncommunicative nature of the arguably incriminating disclosures sought to be com-
pelled.").
122 See Mosteller, 73 Va L Rev at 49-50 (cited in note 1) (discussing rationales for the artifi-
cial entity exception to the act of production analysis).
123 See text accompanying notes 74 and 76.
124 See text accompanying note 74.
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Moreover, this approach does not significantly impede the gov-
ernment's ability to obtain the requested documents. If the govern-
ment is precluded from obtaining the documents because of the in-
criminating nature of the act of production, it may have independent
criminal claims against the former employees for theft or obstruction
of justice, which would also result in the production of the docu-
ments. W Another possibility is that the government may compel pro-
duction of the documents by granting the individual immunity.'2' The
corporation may then be prosecuted because the Fifth Amendment
only extends protection to natural persons. The former employee who
is granted immunity may also be prosecuted if the government is able
to obtain the information found in the subpoenaed documents inde-
pendently.'27
C. Change in Control
Once a company has been acquired or merged into another com-
pany, litigation can no longer be brought against that company be-
cause its legal identity has been subsumed or eliminated by a consoli-
dation action.'2 Thus former employees, due to removal, resignation,
or the consolidation itself, can no longer be required to maintain a
representative relationship with that former corporation because the
corporation has ceased to exist. Unlike in the context of dissolution,
there are no remaining fiduciary obligations by any former employees,
officers, or directors, regardless of their position. Instead, the new
company or the acquiring company undertakes these obligations, and
a new custodian maintains the corporate records.' Therefore, the col-
lective entity doctrine should not apply in this context, and courts
should focus on the application of the act of production doctrine.'2
125 See text accompanying notes 83-84.
126 For a general discussion of the act of production and immunity, see Kenneth J. Melilli,
Act-of-Production Immunity, 52 Ohio St L J 223 (1991).
127 See id at 246 (noting that "the protection afforded by the grant of act-of-production
immunity is potentially illusory").
128 Niesz v Gorsuch, 295 F2d 909,913-14 (9th Cir 1961) (concluding that on completion of a
merger the merged company "lost its capacity to be sued as a party defendant," but the surviving
corporation could be joined as a defendant); Heit v Tenneco, Inc, 319 F Supp 884, 886-88 (D Del
1970) (denying standing to a former stockholder of a merged corporation who was attempting to
bring a derivative suit on its behalf).
129 See Stephen M. Flanagan, Charles R.P. Keating and J. Jeffrey Reinholtz, 15 Fletcher Cy-
clopedia of Corporations § 7089 (West 1997 & Supp 1999).
130 The pragmatic difference between the application of these two doctrines means that the
government will be able to obtain all of the documents with respect to a dissolved corporation,
but will need to attribute the act of production itself to the entity instead of an individual,
whereas in the context of a corporation with a continuing existence, the government may not be
able to get all of the documents because of the application of the act of production doctrine and
the ability of the former employee to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.
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As a practical consideration, the situation of consolidation differs
markedly from dissolution, because in a consolidation the corporation
continues to exist through new representatives under a new identity as
a collective entity."' Former employees may still be held personally li-
able for their actions during the time of their employment because
they no longer act in a representative capacity for their former em-
ployer. Because the terminated employee is no longer a representative
of the corporation, government requests for documents in the context
of corporate consolidation are more likely to be targeted at incrimi-
nating the individual. Therefore, these individuals should be afforded
the full Fifth Amendment protections.'32 Although in some ways a
company that disappears in a consolidation is analogous to one that
dissolves, the fundamental difference is a lack of any continuing fidu-
ciary obligation on the part of the former employees, officers, or direc-
tors of an absorbed company, unlike the continuing obligation in the
case of a dissolved company. Thus, the need to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination is the same as in the context of a company
whose identity is lost in consolidation, and the act of production doc-
trine should apply in this context as well.
The Eleventh Circuit's focus on the content and nature of the
documents requested rather than the representative status of the for-
mer employee for the purposes of the collective entity doctrine33 fails
to incorporate all of the subtle differences between the various cir-
cumstances that may result in termination of employment. However,
the Court's shift to the compelled testimony standard and away from
the contents of the documents themselves suggests that the applica-
tion of the collective entity doctrine turns on the nature of the rela-
tionship of the individual with the corporation rather than the con-
tents of the documents requested. Deference to corporate law princi-
ples in determining whether a representative relationship continues to
exist past termination may be helpful in analyzing whether a represen-
tative relationship exists.
CONCLUSION
Uncertainty remains as to whether the content and nature of docu-
ments requested by a subpoena duces tecum continues to be relevant
in the context of a former employee. More specifically, the applicabil-
ity of the collective entity doctrine to former employees is ambiguous.
131 See Flanagan, Keating, and Reinholtz, 15 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations § 7069
(cited in note 129).
132 Consider Saxon Industries, 722 F2d at 987 (explaining why the act of production might
be self-incriminating to the individual). See also text accompanying notes 74 and 76.
133 See note 90 and accompanying text.
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The collective entity doctrine turns on the notion that a representative
relationship exists between an employee and his corporate employer,
thus precluding the individual from invoking his personal privilege
against self-incrimination to refuse the production of requested cor-
porate documents. This Comment seeks to introduce principles of
corporate law to determine whether a representative relationship con-
tinues to exist between a former employee and a corporation and
proposes that the collective entity doctrine should cease to apply
when a former employee's representative status is terminated with
employment. Thus, when a representative relationship has terminated,
the act of production doctrine should apply to protect the individual's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and courts and
prosecutors should look to alternative means for obtaining the infor-
mation they seek.
